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Abstract 
 
To explain consciousness as a physical process we must acknowledge the role of energy 
in the brain. Energetic activity is fundamental to all physical processes and causally drives 
biological behaviour. Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in a way that 
suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity in the brain. 
The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do not fully un-
derstand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness. According to the principle 
outlined here, energy, along with forces and work, can be described as actualized differ-
ences of motion and tension. By observing physical systems, we can infer there is some-
thing it is like to undergo actualized difference from the intrinsic perspective of the sys-
tem. Consciousness occurs because there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo 
a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.  
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Introduction 
 
“If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, in-
trinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case 
remains a mystery.” (Nagel, 1974) 
 
The philosopher Thomas Nagel summarised one of our greatest intellectual challenges: 
how to explain mental processes as physical processes. The aim of this paper is to outline 
a principle according to which consciousness could be explained as a physical process 
caused by the organization of energy in the brain.1  
 
Energy is fundamentally important in all physical processes (Boltzman, 1886; Lotka, 
1922; Schrödinger, 1944; Heisenberg, 1958). As the biophysicist Harold Morowitz put 
it: “the flow of energy through a system acts to organize that system” (Morowitz, 1979). 
Light, chemical reactions, electricity, mechanical work, heat, and life itself can all be 
described in terms of energetic activity (Chaisson, 2001; Morowitz and Smith, 2007; 
Smil, 2008) as can metabolic processes in the body and brain (Magistretti, 2008; Perez 
Velazquez, 2009). It is surprising, therefore, that energy receives relatively little attention 
in neuroscientific and psychological studies of consciousness. Leading scientific theories 
of consciousness do not reference it (Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011; 
                                               
1 I take it that physical processes occur in time and space and are causally determined by the actions of 
energy, forces and work upon matter. I take consciousness to be the capacity for awareness of self and 
world, which is particularly highly developed in humans. 
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Dehaene, 2014; Oizumi et al., 2014), assign it only a marginal role (Hameroff and 
Penrose, 2014), or treat it as an information-theoretical quantity (Friston, 2013; Riehl et 
al., 2017). If it is discussed, it is either as a substrate underpinning higher level emergent 
dynamics (Deacon, 2013) or as powering neural information processing (Sterling and 
Laughlin, 2017).  
 
This lack of attention is all the more surprising given that some of the pioneers of 
neurobiology, psychology, and physiology found a central place for energy in their 
theories, including Hermann von Helmholtz (in Cahan, 1995), Gustav Fechner (Fechner, 
1905), Sigmund Freud (Gay, 1998), William James (James, 1907), and Charles 
Sherrington (Sherrington, 1940).2 There are, however, signs that attention is turning again 
to energetic or thermodynamic-related theories of consciousness in various branches of 
science (Deacon, 2013; Collell et al., 2015; Annila, 2016; Tozzi et al., 2016; Street, 2016; 
Marchetti, 2018) and in philosophy of mind (Strawson, 2008/2017).  
 
The present paper builds on this work by proposing that energy, and the related properties 
of force and work, can be described as actualized differences of motion and tension, and 
that — in Nagel’s phrase — ‘there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo’ actu-
alised differences. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that consciousness is a prod-
uct of the way energetic activity is organized in the brain. Following this evidence, I 
propose that we experience consciousness because there is something it is like, intrinsi-
cally, to undergo a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.  
 
Several researchers have tackled the problem of consciousness by treating the brain in 
principle as a neural information processor (e.g. Tononi et al., 2016; Dehaene et al., 2017; 
Ruffini, 2017). I will argue that the governing principle of the brain at the neural level is 
not information processing but energy processing. The information-theoretic approach to 
measuring and modelling brain activity, however, can usefully complement the energetic 
approach outlined here. 
 
1. Consciousness and energy in the brain 
 
We do not fully understand the biological function of energy in the brain or how it relates 
to the presence of consciousness in the person.3 Given that the human brain accounts for 
only 2% of the body’s mass it demands a large portion of the body’s total energy budget, 
some 20% (Laughlin, 2001; Magistretti & Allaman, 2013). Most of this energy is derived 
from the oxidization of glucose supplied to the cerebral tissue through the blood. Roy and 
Sherrington were the first to propose a direct correspondence between changes in cerebral 
blood flow and functional activity (Roy and Sherrington, 1890). Many features of human 
brain anatomy, such as the number of blood vessels per unit of space, the lengths of neural 
connections, the width of axons, and even the ratio of brain to stomach size are thought 
to be determined by the high metabolic demands associated with complex cognitive 
processing (Allen, 2009).  
 
                                               
2 For further discussion on the historical context see Pepperell (2018). 
3 Although for the sake of brevity I refer in this paper to consciousness occurring in the brain, conscious-
ness is something that people undergo. Brains cannot sustain consciousness independently of the people 
in which they are housed (Pepperell, 1995/2003).  
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For many neuroscientists, the main function of energy in the brain is to fuel neural sig-
nalling and information processing (Magistretti, 2013); energy supply is seen as a con-
straint on the design and operation of the brain’s computational architecture (Laughlin, 
2001; Hall et al., 2012; Sterling and Laughlin, 2017). It has been calculated, for example, 
that the rate of energy supply available to the human brain places an upper ‘speed limit’ 
on neural processing of about 1 kHz (Attwell and Gibb, 2005). And Schölvinck et al. 
(2008) estimated that conscious perception of sensory stimuli increases energy consump-
tion in primate brains by less that 6% compared to energy consumption in the absence of 
conscious perception.4 They attribute this relatively small change to an energy efficient 
“design strategy” of the brain in which decreases in neural activity play a functional role 
in information processing as well as increases. Energy, on these accounts, plays no direct 
role in higher mental processes, like consciousness.  
 
Robert Shulman and colleagues have argued there is a direct connection between energy 
in the brain and consciousness (Shulman et al., 2009; Shulman, 2013). By studying the 
progressive loss of behavioural response to external stimulus from wakefulness to deep 
anaesthesia, they found a corresponding reduction and localisation of cerebral metabo-
lism (a marker of energy consumption). Therefore, they argue, high global metabolism is 
necessary for consciousness. However, they are also clear that high global metabolic rates 
are not sufficient as patients with locked-in-syndrome and those who suffer from some 
forms of epileptic seizure can register high levels of global brain metabolism without 
exhibiting the observable behaviour that we expect from a conscious person (Shulman, 
2013; Bazzigaluppi et al., 2017). Shulman’s thesis has been challenged on several 
grounds (Seth, 2014). For example, it has been pointed out that behavioural responsive-
ness may be inadequate as a measure of sentience given that vestiges of consciousness 
have been detected in people diagnosed as being in a vegetative state with a low cerebral 
metabolism (Owen et al., 2006). Moreover, some patients who recover from a vegetative 
state to regain consciousness do so despite having substantially reduced cerebral metab-
olism compared with normal controls (Laureys et al., 1999; Chatelle et al., 2011). 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in intrinsic brain activity (Clarke and 
Sokoloff, 1999; Raichle, 2011). This background or spontaneous activity occurs in the 
resting awake state in the absence of external stimulation or directed attention, and its 
energy demands can greatly exceed those of localised activation due to task performance 
or attention. The discovery of this so-called ‘dark energy’ in the brain (Raichle, 2010) 
was greeted with some surprise in the neuroscience community and remains controversial 
(Morcom & Fletcher, 2007). Work on intrinsic activity led to the identification of a 
‘default mode network’ in the brain, an extended set of interconnected regions that uses 
high levels of energy when a person is in a non-attentive state. Energy use drops 
significantly in this network when a more cognitively demanding task, such as paying 
attention to a stimulus, is performed (Shulman et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001). 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2009) reported that connectivity within the default mode network 
in patients with severe brain-damage deteriorates in proportion to the degree of conscious 
impairment, suggesting it plays an important role in sustaining consciousness. 
 
Meanwhile, it is somewhat surprising to find that energy use during non-rapid eye move-
ment sleep remains at ~85% of that in the waking state, while during rapid eye movement 
sleep it can be as high as in the waking state (Dinuzzo et al., 2017). At the same time, 
                                               
4 Strictly speaking energy is not consumed but converted from one form to another.  
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consciousness can be minimally sustained with energy use at only 42% of the level that 
occurs in healthy conscious individuals, suggesting that much cerebral metabolic activity 
in normal waking states does not directly contribute to consciousness (Stender et al., 
2016). Many anaesthetic agents are thought to obliterate consciousness because they re-
duce the global rate of cerebral metabolism (Hudetz, 2012). Administering ketamine, on 
the other hand, increases brain metabolism yet can still lead to loss of responsiveness (Pai 
and Heining, 2007). Overall, it seems we find no clear correlation between the total 
amount of energy used by the brain, or the location where the energy is used, and the 
level of consciousness detectable in the person.  
 
2. Consciousness and the organization of energetic processing in the brain 
 
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, way to think about this issue is in terms of 
how the energetic activity in the brain is organized rather than its global level or localisa-
tion. Indeed, this has implicitly been the focus of recent research that aims to provide 
quantitative measures of consciousness levels. In one study, researchers used transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to send a magnetic pulse through the brains of healthy con-
trols and patients with various states of impaired consciousness (Casali et al., 2013). By 
measuring how the pulse perturbed the cortex the researchers were able to determine the 
relative complexity and extent of the pathways through which the pulse propagated and 
correlate these to levels of consciousness. The researchers calculated a perturbation-com-
plexity index (PCI) that quantified the levels of consciousness present in each person they 
studied. This method was further validated as a reliable objective measure of levels of 
consciousness by Casarotto et al. (2016). 
 
The PCI was calculated using data from electroencephalographic (EEG) measurements 
of the cerebral perturbation following the TMS. Images from the EEG were filtered into 
binary data that was then analysed using a Lempel–Ziv algorithm, a commonly used in-
formation-theoretical technique in which complexity is measured as a function of data 
string compressibility, with more complex data strings being less compressible (Ziv and 
Lempel, 1977; Aboy et al., 2006). Other researchers have developed similar information-
theoretical methods for quantifying the complexity of brain activity and levels of con-
sciousness. King et al. (2013) analysed data from 181 EEG recordings of patients who 
were diagnosed with varying states of impaired consciousness and applied a measure of 
weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI) that sharply distinguished between pa-
tients in vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and conscious state.  
 
Although information theoretic tools were being used to analyse and interpret the data in 
these studies we should note that what was actually being detected by the experimental 
procedures was not information per se but the organization of energetic activity or pro-
cessing in the brain. Energetic processing — the processes by which the brain regulates 
the flow of energy through its structures — is routinely detected at varying degrees of 
spatial and temporal resolution, either directly or indirectly, by neuroimaging techniques 
such as positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance image 
(fMRI) and EEG (Shulman, 2013; Bailey et al., 2005; Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva, 
1987). Referring again to the study by Casali et al. (2013), the perturbations from which 
the PCI was calculated were generated by a pulse of magnetic energy from the TMS and 
were imaged with EEG that measures electrical voltage differences, that is, fluctuations 
in energetic potentials between clusters of neurons in the cortex (Niedermeyer and Lopes 
da Silva, 1987; Hu et al., 2009; Koponen et al., 2015). The PCI and wSMI can therefore 
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be interpreted as measures of the complexity or organization of energetic processing in 
the brain during the experimental procedures.  
 
Subsequent research has directly investigated the connection between brain metabolism 
(how the brain regulates energy conversion), brain organization, and levels of conscious-
ness by combining EEG measures with PET, a more specific measure of cerebral metab-
olism. Chennu et al. (2017) collected data from 104 patients in varying states of conscious 
impairment using both techniques. By analysing this data, they determined a metric that 
discriminated levels of consciousness to a high degree of accuracy. This study built on 
previous work by Demertzi et al. (2015) that used fMRI to correlate a measure of intrinsic 
functional connectivity in the brain with levels of consciousness. The PCI method has 
been further validated by a study combining EEG and 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-
PET (Bodart et al., 2017), so reinforcing the link between levels of consciousness and the 
organization of metabolic activity in the brain. 
Current brain imaging methods do not strictly speaking detect information processing.5 
They do, however, detect changes associated with increases in energy consumption (via 
fMRI and PET) and fluctuations in electrical potential energy (via EEG), both of which 
reliably correlate with changes in mental function and behaviour. On the basis of what 
we can observe, the brain operates according to the principle of energetic processing. The 
evidence discussed above suggests levels of consciousness are determined by the organ-
ization of energy processing in the brain rather than on its global level or localization; 
wakeful conscious states are associated with more complex organization. To understand 
why this might be we need to consider the concept of energy in more depth.  
3. Energy  
 
The concept of energy that we are familiar with today emerged only slowly from its be-
ginnings in the late eighteenth century. It developed through the study of thermodynamics 
in the nineteenth century, and then found its place at the centre of theories of relativity, 
quantum mechanics, and cosmology in the twentieth (Coopersmith, 2010). In colloquial 
usage energy refers to ideas of vigour, vitality, power, activity, and zest. In scientific 
usage, however, energy is defined as the ability of a system to do work.6 Work is defined 
as the transfer of energy involved in moving an object over a distance by an external 
force, at least part of which is applied in the direction of the displacement (Duncan, 2002). 
Scientists and engineers often refer to energy as an abstract property: “Energy is a math-
ematical abstraction that has no existence apart from its functional relationship to other 
variables” (Abbott and Van Ness, 1972. See also Rose, 1986). It is a property that can be 
converted from one form to another, and in an isolated system the total quantity is con-
served (Smil, 2008).  
 
Despite the enormous amount of interest in the physics of energy and its central im-
portance in so many branches of science, its nature remains in many ways mysterious 
                                               
5 The authors of Wollstadt (2017), for example, studied the breakdown of local information processing 
under anaesthesia using information theoretic methods. They point out that the EEG procedure they used 
did not directly record information processing in the brain but local field potentials, that is, fluctuations in 
quantities of potential energy. 
6 There seems to be an ambiguity in some textbooks about whether energy is an enabling property pos-
sessed by a system or body, e.g. Duncan (2002), or a measure of such a property, e.g. Rennie (2015). I 
will take energy to be a property possessed by systems or bodies, quantities of which can be measured.  
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(Feynman, 1963; Smil, 2008; Coopersmith, 2010) and it has been the subject of relatively 
little philosophical interrogation (Coelho, 2009). Treating energy as an abstract account-
ing quantity is perfectly satisfactory for many scientific purposes, where there is little 
reason to question its nature. But if energetic activity plays a significant role in conscious-
ness, as the evidence cited above suggests it might, then its nature deserves closer scru-
tiny.  
 
The concept of energy in the European intellectual tradition can be traced back to Aristo-
tle who used but never precisely defined the term energeia (ενέργεια) to convey the ideas 
of action, activity, actuality, being at work, and acting purposefully (Sachs in Aristotle, 
2002). Scholars have long debated the best way to translate energeia from ancient Greek. 
The word ‘energy’ itself has been used, as have ‘activity’ and ‘actuality’, but ‘being-at-
work’ is currently favoured, partly due to energeia’s roots in ergon, the ancient Greek for 
work (Aristotle, 1818; Ellrod, 1982; Sachs in Aristotle, 2002). Modern scholars have 
tended to quarantine the ancient concept of energeia from contemporary ideas about en-
ergy. But Aristotle’s term may still have value when thinking about energy’s nature. This 
is especially so when we take into account the ideas of Aristotle’s intellectual forebear 
Heraclitus, whose cosmological view was informed by three main principles: (i) that ac-
tivity in nature is driven by ‘fire’ — which has been interpreted as synonymous with 
energy (Heisenberg, 1958), (ii) is subject to continual flux or motion, and (iii) is struc-
tured by antagonism or tension and (Kahn, 1989; Sachs in Aristotle, 2002).  
 
We now understand there to be two main forms of energy: kinetic and potential. Kinetic 
energy is possessed by objects due to their motion, while potential energy is possessed 
by objects due to their relative position or configuration. All other forms of energy, such 
as thermal, electromagnetic, solar, chemical, gravitational, atomic and so on are in them-
selves forms of either kinetic or potential energy (Duncan, 2002; Smil, 2008). Much can 
be said about kinetic and potential energy, including the fact that they are causally effi-
cacious, that is, they cause real change and activity in the material world.7 But I want to 
draw attention here to the fact that they are both expressions of difference. Kinetic energy 
is difference as motion or change; potential energy is difference as tension or antagonism. 
Neither kinetic nor potential energy inhere absolutely in objects but are relational prop-
erties; motion or change occurs relative to a frame of reference, and tension or antagonism 
ocuurs between one object, or force, and another. The concept of difference then is of 
utmost importance when considering the nature of energy and the related properties of 
force and work.8  
 
4. Actualized difference 
 
If energy is the ability to do work then the displacement of a body undergoing work is 
due to force, defined as the “agency that tends to change the momentum of a massive 
body” (Rennie, 2015) or less formally as a “push or a pull”. Forces act and react antago-
nistically in equally opposing pairs and are therefore, like energy, expressions of differ-
ence. The discipline of physics finds it convenient to treat energy, forces and work as 
                                               
7 “Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world” (Heisenberg, 1958). The neu-
robiologist Gerald Edelman neatly defined causal efficacy as “The action in the physical world of forces 
or energies that lead to effects or physical outcomes” (Edelman, 2004). 
8 Neuroanthropologist Terence Deacon defines energy as a “relationship of difference” (Deacon, 2013). 
Note that energy is difference, but not all differences are energy; red is a colour, not all colours are red. 
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distinct quantities to be balanced in abstract mathematical equations. But in nature they 
are integral and actualized, acting collectively in time and space with causal efficacy.  
 
By observing nature, we can infer there is ‘something it is like’ to be a physical system 
undergoing antagonistic forceful interactions, and what it is like will vary as the interac-
tions vary.9 There is something it is like, for example, to be a piece of rope undergoing 
great tension that is different from what it is like to be the same rope when relaxed, or for 
a rock to crash to earth having been in freefall. Some effects of these interactions may be 
observed from an extrinsic perspective; we may hear a creak or a crunch. But the some-
thing it is like to undergo the interactions themselves is an intrinsic property of the ob-
served system to which the extrinsic observer has no access. It is for this reason that its 
presence and nature can only be inferred.10  
 
This is not to claim that forces acting at the subatomic scale between particles, or at the 
macro scale in rope or rock, undergo anything like the experience we undergo as con-
scious humans.11 Something it is like-ness is not in itself consciousness. Rather, it is to 
recognise that:  
 
(i) energy, forces, and work are actualized, 
(ii) they are expressions of difference, and 
(iii) there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo actualized difference.  
 
I use the term actualized difference to refer to the active, antagonistic nature of energy, 
forces and work in a way that encompasses Heraclitean cosmology, Aristotlean energeia, 
and contemporary scientific descriptions of energy. Mathematical equations can represent 
actualized differences with abstract differences, in the form of symbols and numbers, but 
not whatever it is that puts the “fire in the equation” (Hawking, 1988).12 For that we must 
refer back to nature itself — to the territory rather than the map (Korzybski, 1933). 
 
5. Energy and information 
 
For many contemporary scientists, information is a fundamental property of nature. For 
some it is the most fundamental property of nature (Davies, 2010). Neuroscientists often 
claim that the brain operates according to the principle of information processing. We 
read that “the brain is fundamentally an organ that manipulates information” (Sterling 
and Laughlin, 2017) and that brains are “information processing machines” (Ruffini, 
2017). Individual neurons are treated as information processing units, while neural firing 
patterns are converted into sequences of binary digits (1s and 0s) that encode information 
                                               
9 Nagel clarified the term ‘something it is like’ as meaning not what something resembles but ‘how it is’ 
for the system (Nagel, 1974). 
10 Note that this claim is not as far-fetched as it might at first seem: If (i) consciousness in people is a 
physical process — due to energy, forces and work — and (ii) we infer the presence of consciousness in 
other people on the basis of observing them extrinsically — as we habitually do — and (iii) there is some-
thing it is like to be a conscious person — as we assume there is — then (iv) we routinely infer the pres-
ence of an intrinsic something it is like-ness in a physical process on the basis of observing it from an ex-
trinsic perspective. However, as discussed below, human consciousness is a particular kind of something 
it is like-ness that occurs only when certain conditions are met.  
11 In discussions of the nature and behaviour of forces at the microscopic level we often find references to 
the way they ‘feel’ (Feynman, 1963), or the way they ‘experience’ each other in fields (Rennie, 2015). It 
would be interesting to investigate what motivates the use of such terms in this context.  
12 The difference between 1 and 0, for example, is an abstract difference conceived within a conscious 
mind.  
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(Koch, 2004). Recent prominent theories claim consciousness is identical with (Tononi 
et al., 2016) or results from (Dehaene et al., 2017) certain kinds of information structures 
or information processes in brains.  
 
Information is variously and sometimes imprecisely defined in science (Capurro and 
Hjørland, 2005), its meaning is still strongly contested (Lombardi et al., 2016; Roederer, 
2016), and many people regard it as being to some extent subjective, relativistic, or ob-
server-dependent (von Foerster, 2003; Deacon, 2010; Werner, 2011; Logan, 2012; Searle, 
2013; de-Wit et al., 2016). The term is often used in science colloquially (meaning ‘what 
is conveyed by an arrangement of things’) or “intuitively” (Erra et al., 2016). And where 
one might expect to find a clear definition, such as in a dictionary of physics, biology or 
chemistry, none appears (Rennie, 2015; Hine, 2015; Rennie, 2016).  
 
The most widely cited technical definition of information is that given by Claude Shannon 
(1948) as part of his mathematical theory of communication. For Shannon, information 
does not refer to meaning or semantics, as it does colloquially. The information is the 
amount of uncertainty in a message (a sequence of data) measured through probabilistic 
analysis of its elements. Information theory has developed into an exceptionally powerful 
mathematical tool that can be used, among many other things, to measure the complexity 
of physical systems. But a quantity of Shannon information is a measure of what can be 
known about a system as distinct from the system itself. The information lies with the 
measurer rather than the measured.13   
 
The other commonly cited definition of information is Gregory Bateson’s “a difference 
that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1979). Like his fellow cybernetic theorist Norbert 
Wiener (1948), Bateson sharply distinguished information from energy. Difference is not 
a property of what he calls the “ordinary material universe” governed by energetic activ-
ity. It is not subject to the effects of impacts and forces but is an abstract, relational prop-
erty of the mind that exists outside the realm of physical causation: “Difference, being of 
the nature of relationship, is not located in time or space”. Information defined according 
to Bateson as a “nonsubstantial” abstract difference cannot be used to explain conscious-
ness as a physical process.14 
 
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposed by Tononi and col-
leagues provides an alternative, non-Shannonian, definition of information as “a form in 
cause-effect space” (Tononi et al., 2016). Cause-effect space, according to their theory, 
contains a “conceptual structure”— a constellation of related concepts — that is specified 
by the “physical substrate of consciousness” (PSC), this being the precise complexes of 
neural activation involved in any experience. Each conscious experience is identical with 
this “form”, denoted Φmax when maximally integrated. But while IIT is presented as a 
                                               
13 Arieh Ben-Naim sets out in some detail how Shannon information is a probabilistic measure rather than 
a physical property (Ben-Naim, 2015). Note that the act of measurement presupposes a conscious mind 
capable of carrying out the measurement procedure and interpreting the result. 
14 Had he a fuller understanding of the nature of energy Bateson might not have been so dismissive about 
its role in mental processes. In Mind and Nature (Bateson, 1979) he referred only to kinetic energy 
(which he defined as “MV2”), thus ignoring potential energy, and was by his own admission “not up to 
date in modern physics”. In fact, slightly modifying Bateson’s much-cited phrase to an actualized differ-
ence that makes a difference yields a description of the essence of energetic action, that is, the way en-
ergy, forces and work act antagonistically to effect change and cause further actions.  
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theory of integrated information, it could equally serve as a theory of how energetic pro-
cessing is organized since the PSC consists in the causally interrelated patterns of neural 
firing that are identical with the conscious experience.  
 
Treating brains as neural information processors does not help us to understand con-
sciousness as a physical process because information, according to the commonly ac-
cepted definitions, is not a physical property of brains at the neural level; there is no 
information in a neuron.15 It is useful, however, to apply information-theoretical methods 
to study the organization of physical systems, such as brains. Norbert Wiener (1948) 
stated: “…the amount of information in a system is a measure of its degree of organiza-
tion…” As exemplified in several studies and theories cited here, we can measure and 
model the way the organization of energetic processes in the brain contributes to the pres-
ence of consciousness in a person.16 But the abstract difference between 0 and 1 is not 
equivalent to the actualized difference between a neuron at rest and firing. 
  
6. The brain as a ‘difference engine’ 
 
The challenge of explaining consciousness as a physical process is made more tractable, 
I suggest, by recognising that brains operate on the principle of energetic processing. 
Neurons, in concert with other material structures such as astrocytes and mitochondria, 
convert, distribute, and dissipate electro-chemical energy through highly organized path-
ways in order to drive behaviours critical to the organism’s survival. This makes sense 
when we consider the fact that organisms inhabit a physical world that is structured 
through the actions of energy, forces and work. To survive and prosper in this world they 
must continually work to acquire new supplies of high-grade or free energy to maintain 
an internal state far from thermodynamic equilibrium (Boltzmann, 1886; Schrödinger, 
1944; Schneider & Sagan, 2005). Besides internal regulation, nervous systems enable 
organisms to perform two major tasks: discriminating between variations in environmen-
tal conditions, such as temperature, acidity, salinity, nutrient levels, or presence of pred-
ators, and moving towards environmental conditions that are beneficial to survival and 
away from those that are harmful.  
 
The mechanisms that enable performance of these tasks can be seen at work in organisms 
with relatively simple nervous systems, such as the C. elegans worm (Sterling and Laugh-
lin, 2017). Chemical gradients in the environment activate chemosensory neurons on the 
worm’s surface that connect via interneurons to motor neurons that control the action of 
dorsal and ventral muscles, which, in turn, control the worm’s movement (de Bono and 
Maricq, 2005). In this way, differences of chemical potential energy in the environment 
are converted into differences of electro-chemical energy in the sensing apparatus of the 
                                               
15 Brains — as parts of people — process information in the colloquial sense, just as they process abstract 
ideas, equations, numbers, thoughts, emotions, or memories. But they do so as a consequence of the un-
derlying energetic processing (conversion, distribution, dissipation) going on in neural tissue. Computers 
also ‘process’ information in the colloquial sense. Mechanically and electronically speaking, however, 
they actually manipulate energy states (voltages, light, etc.) the results of which we, as conscious people, 
interpret informationally. It is worth noting that all mechanical information processing necessarily entails 
the dissipation of a certain amount of energy (Landauer, 1961). Recent experiments have confirmed this 
principle and demonstrated the intimate link between energy and what many refer to as information (Bé-
rut et al., 2012). 
16 Logan (2012), in work undertaken with Stuart Kauffman and others, defines ‘biotic information’ as the 
organization of the exchange of energy and matter between organism and environment — a further exam-
ple of information theory being used to quantify the biological organization of energy flows.  
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organism and then into differences of chemical energy in the muscles, which, by antago-
nistic action, are converted into the kinetic energy of the organism’s movement. The or-
ganism makes discriminations in the environment relevant to its interests so that it can 
take appropriate actions in response.  
 
We can see the same basic principle at work in biology of far greater complexity. The 
human visual system, for example, is highly demanding on the brain’s energy budget 
(Wong-Riley, 2010). But the evolutionary benefit of human vision is the capacity it con-
fers to guide finely controlled bodily actions in light of environmental conditions. This is 
achieved through an intricate sequence of energy conversions, beginning with the arrival 
at the retina of electro-magnetic energy from the environment and cascading through nu-
merous energetic exchanges in the neural pathways of the visual system that progressively 
differentiate features of the environment (Hubel and Livingstone, 1987). This frequently 
results in the conversion of electro-chemical energy in the motor system and muscles to 
the kinetic energy of bodily movement (Goodale, 2014). The fact that our complex biol-
ogy supports so rich a repertoire of sensory discriminations and motor responses may be 
only a difference of degree rather than of kind with the humble worm.  
 
We might think of sensory cells responding to stimulation from environmental energy by 
becoming excited or by increasing local neural activation. But vertebrate photoreceptors 
are, contrary to what one might expect, hyperpolarised by photon absorption. This means 
they ‘turn off’ when exposed to light and ‘turn on’ in the dark, even though they use more 
energy in the dark (Wong-Riley, 2010).17 Meanwhile, some of the neurobiological evi-
dence cited in Section 1 cautions us against assuming that sensory stimulation always 
results in increased neural activation. Decreases in activation in the brain can occur in 
response to cognitively demanding tasks, yet can go unnoticed in imaging studies with 
methodologies designed to detect task-evoked increases in metabolic rate above baseline 
(Raichle et al., 2001; Schölvinck et al., 2008). And of course not all neural activation is 
excitatory; neural inhibition is vitally important in brain function, as elsewhere in the 
nervous system, and this also entails an energetic cost (Buzsáki et al., 2007). There is 
evidence that an optimal balance between neural excitation and inhibition (E-I balance) 
in the cerebral cortex is critical for the brain to function well (Zhou & Yu, 2018). 
 
In light of these mechanisms, the energy-hungry brain might be understood as a kind of 
‘difference engine’ that works by actuating complex patterns of motion (action potential 
propagation) and tension (antagonistic pushes and pulls between forces) at various spati-
otemporal scales. Firing rates and electrical potentials vary within neurons, between neu-
rons, between networks of neurons, and between brain regions, so maximising the differ-
ential states the brain undergoes. A decrease in activation, or a reduction in firing rate, 
can create a differential state just as much as an increase. And, as is indicated by the work 
of Schölvinck et al. (2008), deactivation may be an energy efficient way for the brain to 
increase its repertoire of differential states. Maintaining a global E-I balance across spa-
tiotemporal scales, meanwhile, is thought to promote ‘efficient coding’ in sensory and 
cognitive processing (Zhou & Yu, 2018). All this lends support to the idea, proposed 
above, that one of the roles of energetic activity in the brain is to efficiently actuate dif-
ferences of motion and tension that advance the interests of the brain-bearing organism. 
It is the actualized difference that makes the difference. 
 
                                               
17 It turns out this arrangement is energy efficient for the visual system overall (Wong-Riley, 2010). 
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7. Energetic organization as the cause of consciousness 
 
In theory, we could account for all the highly complex processes occurring in the brain in 
terms of energy, forces and work, that is, as physical, chemical and biological processes. 
But the seemingly unassailable problem of how any of these processes might cause con-
sciousness remains. The principle outlined here — that there is something it is like, in-
trinsically to undergo differences due to the antagonistic action of energy, forces and work 
— may offer a toehold in the slippery face of the problem. There is something it is like, 
intrinsically, to be a tense muscle that is different from being a relaxed muscle. There is 
something it is like, intrinsically, to be networks of neurons in fantastically complex states 
of actualized differentiation from other networks, with action potentials propagating 
through vast arrays of fibres. But all this something is it like-ness is not in itself con-
sciousness. Muscles are not conscious, and networks of neurons are active in the brain 
when we are in dreamless sleep or under anaesthesia. What is it about the organization of 
energetic processes in the brain, as discussed in Section 2, that determines the level of 
consciousness we experience?  
 
We gain some insight into the association between consciousness and the organization of 
energetic processing in the brain from studies of anaesthesia. The reason why anaesthetic 
agents obliterate consciousness is not understood (Mashour, 2004). Recent work has fo-
cused on the ways in which they interfere with the brain’s capacity to generate patterns 
of localised differentiation (often termed ‘information’) and to bind together or integrate 
those patterns across widely distributed brain networks (Hudetz, 2012; Hudetz & Mash-
our, 2016). Evidence from studies on the neurological effects of anaesthetics suggests 
that consciousness is lost as distant regions of the brain become functionally isolated and 
global integration breaks down (Lewis et al., 2012). The idea that consciousness depends 
on maximising differentiation and integration in the brain lies at the heart of IIT (Tononi, 
2012; Oizumi et al., 2014).  
 
A potential mechanism supporting global integration of local differentiation is recurrent 
or reentrant processing, in which widely distributed areas of the brain engage in complex 
loops of cortical feedback via massively parallel connections (Edelman et al. 2011; Edel-
man & Gally, 2013). A number of studies of the effects of anaesthetics have shown that 
they disrupt feedback connectivity, and hence integration, particularly in the frontoparie-
tal area of the brain (Lee et al., 2009; Hudetz & Mashour, 2016). Studies of brain organ-
ization during deep sleep have also reported an increase in modularity consistent with the 
loss of integration among regions of the brain found in the awake state (Tagliazucchi et 
al., 2013). This suggests that the presence of consciousness in a wakeful person depends 
on a certain level of functional integration supported by cortical feedback loops (Edel-
man, 2004; Alkire et al., 2008) but it is not known how or why. 
 
A major contribution of cybernetic theory was to recognise the importance of feedback 
mechanisms for controlling behaviour in mechanical and living systems (Wiener, 1948; 
Bateson, 1972). Feedback systems are self-referential; behaviour of one part of the system 
casually affects another, which in turn affects the first. Such systems are apt to generate 
patterns of behaviour that are an irreducible property of the system as a whole (Hofstadter, 
2007; Deacon, 2013). One example is video feedback, which occurs when a video camera 
is pointed at a screen showing the output from the camera (Crutchfield, 1984). When 
correctly arranged the screen will at first display a tunnel-like image that will then spon-
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taneously ‘blossom’ into an intricate, semi-stable pattern of remarkable diversity and fas-
cinating beauty (see Figure 1).18 Since this is an energetically actuated process we can 
infer, following the arguments already given, that there is something it is like to be the 
video feedback system in full bloom, from its intrinsic perspective. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Stills from a video feedback sequence generated by the author. These patterns are cre-
ated by pointing a video camera at a screen showing the camera’s output. What begins as a tunnel-
like images soon ‘blossoms’ into an ever-changing pattern of great diversity and fascinating 
beauty. © Robert Pepperell, 2018. 
 
Gerald Edelman proposed that “phenomenal experience itself is entailed by appropriate 
reentrant intracortical activity” (Edelman & Gally, 2013). The human brain undergoes 
recursive or reentrant behaviour of an unimaginably higher order of complexity than in 
the video system.19 But the underlying operating principle may be analogous. Video feed-
back arises because the system is organized as a self-observing loop. If we assume that 
reentrant activity in the brain is also a kind of self-observing loop in which processes in 
one part the brain both affect and are affected by processes in other parts, then we can 
envisage a kind of pattern blooming in the brain analogous to that we see in video feed-
back. This pattern would be actuated by sufficiently organized electro-chemical activity, 
among neurons and neurotransmitters, channelled through reentrant neural circuits. 
 
The something it is like-ness a brain organized in this way would be undergoing is of a 
different order to that of a brain with diminished integration in dreamless sleep or under 
anaesthesia. No other physical system, as far as we know, has the same capacity for com-
plex (differentiated and integrated) recursive processing as the human brain, and that dy-
namic organization reaches its apogee when we are wakefully conscious, as suggested by 
the evidence cited in Section 2. When the energetic processes in our brains are operating 
at a certain level of dynamic recursive organization — the “appropriate reentrant intra-
cortical activity” — then we undergo something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo some-
thing it is like, intrinsically, to undergo something it is like … recursively. In other words, 
there is something it is like, intrinsically, to be something it is like, recursively, to undergo 
the particular organization of actualized differences found in the conscious brain. For 
this we have the most direct and irrefutable evidence possible — what it’s like to undergo 
our own conscious experience.20  
                                               
18 Examples can be found on YouTube.  
19 One way to quantify this relative complexity would be to follow the proposal of Chaisson (2001) and 
compare the energy rate density (a measure he calls Φm) between the two systems. Note also that Edel-
man and Gally are careful to distinguish cybernetic feedback in machine control systems from re-entrant 
processing in the brain, the latter being far more complex (Edelman & Gally, 2013). 
20 ‘I think therefore I am undergoing a certain recursive organization of actualized differences.’ Models of 
consciousness based on feedback loops in the brain have been discussed before, including by Douglas 
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Is it reasonable then to propose that consciousness is caused by the way energetic activity 
is dynamically and recursively organized in the brain? It is no less reasonable than attrib-
uting the causes of other biological phenomena, such as the behaviour of the nematode 
worm, to the way energetic activity is organized. If consciousness is a physical (biological 
and chemical) process, and if physical processes are caused by energetic activity (along-
side forces and work), then consciousness, in principle, could be caused by energetic ac-
tivity and the way it is organized.  
 
8. Naturalising consciousness 
 
In 1937–8 Charles Sherrington gave a series of lectures on the relationship between en-
ergy and mind, collected in the volume Man on his Nature (Sherrington, 1940). Drawing 
on the physics of his day, Sherrington understood the natural world to be composed of 
forms of energy. But he could not conceive how the mind could be forged from energy: 
“The energy-concept of Science collects all so-called ‘forms’ of energy into a flock and 
looks in vain for the mind among them.” The mystery was deepened for him by the 
knowledge, then emerging through studies of electrical and metabolic activity in the 
brain, of how intimately energy and the mind must be linked. He was compelled to won-
der “Is the mind in any strict sense energy?” but reluctantly concluded that “…thoughts, 
feelings, and so on are not amenable to the energy (matter) concept.” They lie beyond the 
purview of natural science, despite the “embarrassment” this causes for biology.  
 
If we are to naturalise consciousness, then we must reconcile energy and the mind. I have 
outlined a principle that may help to explain consciousness as a physical process. It entails 
re-examining the modern scientific concept of energy in the light of Aristotle’s energeia 
and its Heraclitean roots. Accordingly, we arrive at a view of physical processes in nature 
as actualized differences of motion and tension. Sherrington understood that “Energy 
acts, i.e. is motion.” But he went on “…of a mind a difficulty is to know whether it is 
motion.” Treating the brain as a difference engine the work of which is to actualize and 
organize differences of motion and tension that serve the interests of the organism is, I 
submit, a natural approach to understanding consciousness as a physical process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
If consciousness is a natural physical process then it should be explicable in terms of 
energy, forces and work. Energy is a physical property of nature that is causally effica-
cious and, like forces and work, can be conceived as actualized differences of motion and 
tension.  
 
Evidence from neurobiology indicates that the brain operates on the principle of energetic 
processing and that a certain organization of energy in the brain, measured with infor-
mation theoretic techniques, can be reliably predict the presence and level of conscious-
ness. Since energy is causally efficacious in physical systems, it is reasonable to claim 
that consciousness is in principle caused by energetic activity and how it is dynamically 
organized in the brain. 
 
                                               
Hofstadter in his book I am a Strange Loop (Hofstadter, 2007). I have also previously proposed a feedback 
model of consciousness partly inspired by Edelman’s theory of reentrant processing as part of an attempt 
to design an artificially conscious work of art (Pepperell, 2003).  
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Information in the biological context is best understood as a measure of the way energetic 
activity is organized, that is, its complexity or degree of differentiation and integration. 
Information theoretic techniques provide powerful tools for measuring, modelling, and 
mapping the organization of energetic processes, but we should not confuse the map with 
the territory. 
 
Actualized differences, as distinct from abstract differences represented in mathematics 
and information theory, are characterised by there being something it is like, intrinsically, 
to undergo those differences, that is, to undergo antagonistic states of opposing forces. 
All actualized differences undergo this something it is like-ness, but not all are conscious.  
 
It is proposed that a particular kind of activity occurs in human brains that causes our 
conscious experience. It is a certain dynamic organization of energetic processes having 
a high degree of differentiation and integration. This organization is recursively self-ref-
erential and results in a pattern of energetic activity that blossoms to a degree of com-
plexity sufficient for consciousness. 
 
If consciousness is a physical process, and physical processes are driven by actualized 
differences of motion and tension, then there is something it is like to undergo actualized 
differences organized in a certain way in the brain, and this is what we experience — 
intrinsically.21  
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